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How We Got to the Credit Crisis
Abstract
The current capital market credit crisis was perpetrated by a confluence of factors, including a potent period of
fear winning over greed; a near collapse of due diligence in the credit markets (a.k.a., more money than
brains); a mismatch of short-term capital and long-term liabilities (and subsequent margin calls); and a critical
error made by the Fed in setting monetary policy. As a result, credit markets will gradually rebalance over the
next twelve months, as greed re-harnesses fear. However, the overall U.S. economy will continue to thrive in
2008, due in large part to government spending.
Disciplines
Real Estate
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T H E C A P I T A L M A R K E T crisis has
people asking, “How did we get here?”
The last time things were this messy—in
the early 1990s, with the disastrous com-
mercial real estate situation exacerbated by
the savings and loan collapse—the cause
was simple: there was no money available
in the system. By contrast, plenty of
money exists today; nevertheless capital
markets are unstable, and the origins of
today’s problem are poorly understood.
The answer to “How did we get here?”
lies in three phenomena that arise at least
once a decade. First, people are always
torn between greed and fear. That is, our
greed is fundamental, but we are also
easily frightened. Think back to the time
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The many and various
factors that led to the current
credit crisis.
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when American neighborhoods were filled
with thirty-foot television antenna towers.
Your mother told you never to climb the
tower because it was dangerous. But you
climbed it to demonstrate your bravery—
a child’s version of greed. With each foot
higher you climbed, the more fearful you
became. At some height, fear trumped
greed—you stopped, and quickly scram-
bled down to the ground. Something sim-
ilar happened in 2005 through early 2007.
Although risk premiums and credit
spreads narrowed, greed kept investors in
the market. The lower spreads became, the
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Figure 1: Monthly spreads in the CMBS market
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Figure 2: Credit default swap indices
more fearful intelligent investors became.
Still, most stayed in the market because
they didn’t want to miss out on an oppor-
tunity (Figures 1-3).
In the last twenty years, greed has been
defeated by fear five times. The first time
was the stock market crash of 1987 (Figure
4). Thanks to fear’s victory, investors
ended the day 23 percent poorer than they
had been that morning. Fear spread on a
grand scale and optimism quickly turned
to pessimism. But the financial system sur-
vived and the economy escaped without a
recession. The second time that greed was
defeated by fear was the savings and loans
collapse of 1990, which almost brought
down the American financial system and
also threatened other countries. But again,
we survived. The third episode was the
Russian ruble crisis of 1998, which
sparked widespread investor fear. At first
glance, this episode is hard to explain; after
all, Russia had never in the past paid its
debt (there was still debt outstanding from
Czarist Russia!). But the crisis wasn’t really
about Russian debt—it was about the
basic realization that if lenders are willing
to lend at low spreads to borrowers who
have never paid their debts, then greed had
been winning far too long. The Russian
announcement that they would not service
their debt merely underscored the extent
of greed’s victory. As a result, it was easy for
fear to rout greed. But soon enough, greed
returned in force during the Tech Bubble.
The fourth time pervasive fear won was
immediately after September 11, 2001,
which was understandable. But again, by
early 2003 greed was back.
Now, fear is triumphing for a fifth time
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Figure 3: High yield credit spreads
in twenty years, led by concerns about sub-
prime residential debt. By April 2007,
investors came to the realization that if
lenders were willing to lend at high LTVs,
razor-thin interest rate spreads, and with-
out credit checks, to borrowers with bad
credit records, greed had gone too far. If
borrowers could obtain mortgages (many
on speculative homes), it meant that all
good lending options had been exhausted.
Fear soared as people realized how low
underwriting standards had fallen. But if
the pattern of history holds, greed will be
victorious within two years.
G R E E D R E T U R N S
The seeds of greed’s return are already
being sown. Historically, the first investors
to return during a fearful period are con-
trarian non-institutional investors. These
tend to be “fundamentals” investors who
rely on their own counsel. Their invest-
ments are usually relatively small and fall
below the radar screen. But rumors of
their bottom-feeding profits stiffen the
resolve of institutional investors, some of
whom will invest via opportunistic funds.
Already billions of dollars have been raised
for distressed debt funds, with more in the
pipeline. The capital for these funds
comes not only from high-wealth
investors, but also from university endow-
ments and large pension funds. The pur-
chases by distress funds set floors for asset
prices, providing comfort to more conser-
vative institutional investors.
A unique feature of the current situa-
tion is the nearly $30 billion invested in
U.S. financial institutions (and probably
more via distressed debt funds) by sover-
eign wealth funds. Although not histori-
cally contrarian investors, these sovereign
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wealth funds have boldly gone where less-
er investors fear to tread.Their equity infu-
sions are recapitalizing major financial
institutions, speeding the resumption of
normal capital market operations.
Retail investors and the mass of institu-
tional investors will be the last to return to
the fray. These investors are “herd follow-
ers.” They return only after their consult-
ants certify that others have made money.
Frustrated by low yields on treasuries, and
fearful that they might miss out on the
next upswing, they will begin to return by
mid-to-late 2008. And the return of greed
will be in full swing.
M O R E M O N E Y T H A N B R A I N S
A second phenomenon explains “how we
got here.” Consider that in the history of
measured economic growth, the world
economy never grew as rapidly as it did
between 2002 and 2007 (Figure 5).
Wealth was created faster than at any other
time in history, but the investment infra-
structure lagged the expansion of
investable wealth. In other words, there
was more money than brains. In such a sit-
uation, investors commonly take two
shortcuts. The first is to rely on rating
agencies, rather than due diligence, to
determine investment risk. But the fact is
that rating agencies have never correctly
forecast a major credit collapse until after
the fact! The second common shortcut is
to skip independent due diligence, and
merely rely on “who else is investing.”
After all, “so-and-so is a smart investor,
and they’re in, so it must be a good invest-
ment.” Many investors used this shortcut
for “small” investments (say $50 million),
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Figure 5: Increase in world real GDP
focusing their diligence efforts on larger
investments (say $500 million). The prob-
lem is that when lots of investors trust
other investors to do the diligence, fre-
quently no one ends up doing diligence.
So, there were not enough chairs when the
music stopped, and a lot of “small” $50
million errors quickly added up to billions
in losses.
A S S E T - L I A B I L I T Y M I S M A T C H
The third phenomenon that explains
“how we got here” is that most assets, such
as cash streams on buildings, the returns to
homeownership, and corporate profits, are
long-term, but most liabilities, such as
bank deposits, are short-term. Since most
assets are long-term in nature, there is a
fundamental mismatch of assets and liabil-
ities in the financial system. Mismatched
investors run the risk that their debt will be
subject to a margin call, or that they will be
unable to roll their debt upon maturity. As
long as greed is winning, this mismatch is
not a systemic problem since values gen-
erally increase when greed prevails, which
allows comfortable refinancing and few
margin calls. But when fear defeats greed,
and asset values drop, mismatched short-
term debt presents a serious systemic
problem. As asset values fall, investors
with mark-to-market debt must sell assets
to pay down their debt. As they sell, they
further force asset prices down, causing a
ripple effect, until the process reaches bal-
ance sheets that are strong enough to
withstand margin calls, or until greed
begins to win again.
The credit crisis underscores a funda-
mental challenge of mark-to-market pric-
ing: many (probably most) assets trade
only by appointment. This is true even of
securitized assets. The concept of mark-to-
market revolves around the idea that there
is a “price.” But for the vast majority of
assets (including almost all debt, homes,
private companies, and many stocks) there
is no “price.” Rather, there is a bid price,
and an ask price. For most assets, the bid
and ask prices rarely converge, as witnessed
by the fact that most assets rarely trade.
When greed is winning (which is about
80 percent of the time), price “marks” tend
to reflect ask prices, as the bean-counters
lack the expertise to counter claims by
asset owners that they would not sell for
less because asset prices are trending
upwards. But as fear takes hold, the bean-
counters gravitate to price “marks” in line
with bids, fearful of legal liability if they
overstate “prices.” The result is that
“marks” plunge not only because funda-
mentals may have reduced both bid and
ask prices, but also because “marks” shift
from ask prices to bid prices. Such a shift
can create 10 percent to 30 percent “mark”
declines for illiquid assets.
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But it is wrong to view either the bid
or the ask as the “price,” as a market price
requires the presence of a willing buyer
and a willing seller—that is, for the bid
and ask prices to converge. Owners
should not be forced to accept write-
downs to prices at which they would
never sell. “Marks” should be made using
a consistent method, and never shift from
using the ask to using the bid, as such
inconsistency creates a misleading value
picture. We suggest that for accounting
purposes, the asset owner should always
use their ask price, subject to fraud prose-
cution for using “marks” that systemati-
cally mislead investors. In other words,
asset holders should consistently explain
the worth of their assets. If investors feel
misled by these disclosures, fraud statutes
provide sufficient protection. But switch-
ing between ask and bid prices increases
misinformation. Auditors must not be
asked to divine the “price” of illiquid
assets. Their job should only be to audit
and certify the consistency with which
illiquid assets are marked.
T H E S U B P R I M E M E S S
As the unprecedented growth of global
wealth was already fueling record demand
for safe assets, the Fed made a well-inten-
tioned, but enormous, mistake. After
September 11, 2001, they cut rates, flood-
ing the market with liquidity (Figure 6).
Then for four years they held rates so low
that investors were guaranteed real losses of
1 percent to 2 percent on short-term safe
assets. Faced with guaranteed real loses on
short-term safe assets, investors chose to
invest long and risky, while borrowing
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Figure 6: Real Fed funds rate
short, as at least this strategy offered the
chance of a positive real return. The Fed
forced investors to go longer and riskier
than their expertise, and to mismatch their
asset-liability positions, in effect issuing an
economy-wide mandate to climb up the
risk ladder. As investors steadily climbed
this ladder, it was only a matter of time
until fear prevailed; the trigger was the
subprime residential mortgage market.
Historically, the typical subprime bor-
rower was a small storeowner, or a service
worker such as a waitress, golf caddy, cab
driver, or charter boat captain. What these
workers have in common are large
amounts of unreported cash income.
Consequently, as borrowers they have
mortgage ratios that are “out of formula.”
In other words, their maximum mort-
gages, calculated according to their report-
ed incomes, are less than they what can
actually afford. The solution is to take a
subprime loan and pay an extra 100 to 250
basis points on their mortgages. This pre-
mium is necessary because default rates
have always been high on subprime mort-
gages, as fraud is easy on loans with little
documentation. But these high cash-
income households prefer to pay a mort-
gage premium rather than pay 40 percent
in taxes on their unreported income.
High cash-income household bor-
rowing does not explain why subprime
borrowing skyrocketed in 2005 and
2006, however. Who were the new sub-
prime borrowers? The answer (which is
rarely mentioned in the media) is simple:
speculative homebuyers. From 2004 to
2006, some 500,000 homes were bought
by speculators, who were schooled by
late-night television infomercials to put 5
percent down and triple their money in
six months by flipping the house. Pure
unadulterated greed led these speculators
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Figure 7: Mortgage delinquency rates (90+ days)
to buy with 95 percent LTV mortgages,
secured from greedy lenders seeking a
few extra basis points of spread. To avoid
requesting commercial loans, for which
they would not have qualified, these
speculator-lenders misstated that the
properties were their primary residences.
But as greed rampaged, speculators had
access to abundant high LTV, low (and
no) doc mortgages.
If you lend $285,000 to a family mem-
ber who wants to purchase a $300,000
home, and you do it without a credit
check, that’s imprudent. But if you make
such loans to hundreds of thousands of
people whom you’ve never met, that’s idi-
otic. And idiots deserve to lose their
money. At its heart, the subprime “prob-
lem” is the result of idiots lending to idiots.
Subprime defaults are higher than
their historical norm, because once spec-
ulators realized they couldn’t flip their
homes for quick profits, the game was
over (Figure 7). Many made just one pay-
ment on their mortgage. This is particu-
larly true in Florida, Las Vegas, Phoenix,
and southern California. These areas have
high default rates because they had stun-
ning levels of speculative buying. For
example, Miami absorbed some 10,000
condos in ten years, but roughly 40,000
“pre-sold” units are under construction.
In large part, idiot speculators put down
deposits on these units, with money pro-
vided by idiot lenders.
Is it surprising there are a lot of delin-
quencies by speculative buyers? After all,
why make mortgage payments on an
empty investment home you were plan-
ning to flip for a big profit, once you know
it can’t be done? You don’t feed the beast:
you stop paying and make the lender take
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Figure 8: Subprime mortgages as a percent of originations
the home. We believe most mortgage
defaults in strong economic regions of the
country are by speculative owners. This is
consistent with the rapid rise in 2000
through 2007 of subprime borrowers with
high credit scores (Figure 9). In 2000, 60
percent of all subprime mortgage borrow-
ers had credit scores of less than 620, but
by the first quarter of 2007 only about 40
percent were below that threshold. During
that period, the market share growth pri-
marily occurred in the 620 to 659 and the
740+ credit rating categories, which
increased from 17 percent to 26 percent
and from 3 percent to nearly 9 percent,
respectively. Then the trend reversed in the
second quarter of 2007 when fear began to
surpass greed, and about 60 percent of
subprime borrowers were once again
below the 620 threshold. Similarly, in the
first quarter of 2007, nearly 20 percent of
subprime loans were to borrowers with
credit scores of 700 or greater. This has
since dropped to about 5 percent, versus
the 10 percent “norm” in 2000.
Not all mortgage defaulters are idiot
borrowers. In Ohio and Michigan,
defaulters are people who actually live in
their homes and have been ravaged by a
local recession. Borrowers in these reces-
sion areas have lost the value of their
equity, but they will not lose their homes.
The reality facing lenders in Ohio and
Michigan is that no one other than the
defaulters wants to live in these homes.
These loans will generally have to be
restructured, as there is no other option.
Defaults are also very high in Louisiana
and Mississippi, where many homes no
longer exist, or have been abandoned due
to Hurricane Katrina. Why pay a mort-
gage on a home that no longer exists?
Stop paying and let the mortgage and
insurance companies work it out. The
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Figure 9: Subprime borrower credit scores
lender cannot foreclose on a home that
does not exist anymore.
F A C T A N D F A N T A S Y
As speculative owners defaulted, the extent
of poor underwriting became clear.
Investors became fearful, and asked what
else had been oversold and overrated. After
all, the same people were packaging every-
thing: subprime mortgages, mortgage-
backed securities, and collateralized debt
obligations. As fear took hold, investors
effectively went on strike and stopped buy-
ing these assets. As margin calls occurred
due to rising credit spreads, fear spread,
and investors demanded much larger
returns until they figured out what else was
badly underwritten.
Today is very different from the early
1990s. In the 1990s people did not have
money to invest; today, they do. But they
demand a much higher return. Consider
the example of the Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority, which in order to stay cash-neu-
tral must invest approximately $2 billion
each week. Their recent investment in Citi
amounted to just three and a half weeks of
cash flow.
Financial fantasies are being written by
revisionist financial historians. These fan-
tasies claim that if only the lenders had
held on to the debt they issued, rather than
securitizing and selling the debt, excessive
lending would have been avoided. They
call for the return of whole loan lending
for one’s own account. But this version of
past lender behavior is as overly romanti-
cized, as are revisionist urbanist memories
of the joy of children playing amid street
traffic in the days of old. Just as children
playing in New York City streets was dan-
gerous, not romantic, the history of
lenders who kept their loans was far from
prudent. Remember the Japanese bank
loans for real estate in the 1980s? Or Latin
American lending by U.S. banks in the late
1970s and early 1980s? Or commercial
real estate lending in the 1980s? All of
these lending excesses occurred even as
lenders retained their debt. In fact, reten-
tion of these loans only meant that the
losses were far more concentrated and eas-
ier to hide from investors.
It is greed, not whether institutions
hold or sell their loans, that generates
excessive lending. Debt securitization
evolved in the 1990s in response to the
checkered history of whole loan lending,
in order to diversify losses (among greedy
investors) and to require more rapid reso-
lution of problems. Human nature, not
securitization, is the real culprit.
Unfortunately the idiots who lent to
idiots have created a serious political prob-
lem. Congress and the administration feel
compelled to “do something,” even
though the right thing to do from an eco-
nomic standpoint is nothing. It is very
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dangerous when something is right politi-
cally, but wrong economically. It is clear
that a bailout of idiot borrowers and idiot
lenders is a major mistake, as idiots who
lend to idiots do not deserve to be bailed
out, especially as there is no feasible way to
distinguish the “innocent” (whatever that
means) from the idiots. But although a
bailout is unwise economically, it is proba-
bly a political necessity. The fear is that
such legislation will seriously undercut the
integrity of our capital markets.
The U.S. economy is performing well,
even though we have been told for the last
six years that it is on the brink of disaster.
The U.S. economy continues to grow
because consumers, who make up the
bulk of economy, only need to access cap-
ital markets to buy cars and houses. The
typical consumer buys a new car every
four years, and a home about once every
eight. Consider the capital “need” for a
car: unless you’ve totaled your car, you can
forestall your purchase until spreads on
auto loans return to normal. But while
reduced car buying hurts the auto indus-
try, it does not hurt the economy; con-
sumers will spend the money they would
have spent on a new car on other things.
The same is true of housing purchases.
Mortgage spreads are quite high, especial-
ly on jumbos, so homebuyers are defer-
ring their home purchases. This is bad for
the housing sector, good for apartment
owners, and neutral for the economy.
Since the majority of present homeowners
locked in long-term mortgages at histori-
cally low rates in 2003 through 2005, bid-
ders have to bribe owners to sell their
houses. Young prospective homebuyers
will continue renting for another year or
two. Again, this does not hurt the econo-
my, as they spend the money earmarked
for housing on other things. Consumers
are shifting consumption across cate-
gories, not stopping consumption.
B U T W H A T A B O U T
T H E L O S S E S ?
The newspaper headlines say, “Merrill
Lynch lost $8 billion,” or “Citi lost $11
billion.” How can the economy withstand
such massive losses? It is important not to
confuse losses among participants in the
economy with losses to the economy itself.
If one player at a poker table loses $11 bil-
lion, the table hasn’t lost a dime. The
money simply transferred among the play-
ers. Similarly, subprime lenders lost tens of
billions of dollars, but the U.S. economy
did not lose a dime, since these losses were
transferred to borrowers. The difference is
that the lenders must report their losses,
while private borrowers do not have to
report their gains. But every lender loss is
exactly offset by a borrower gain.
In fact, it could be argued that the
United States made money from the sub-
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prime excess. U.S. lenders probably gave
$100 billion too much to subprime bor-
rowers, which is to say, $100 billion more
than they can pay back. Thus, for U.S.
borrowers, there was an offsetting gain.
But U.S. lenders sold $30 billion to $40
billion of their losses to Germans, French,
Japanese, and Italian investors—anybody
who would buy the overrated paper. Greed
led these foreign buyers to buy loans they
could not possibly understand, in
exchange for 5 to 20 basis points higher
spread. Bad for them, but a net gain for the
United States, as $100 billion in gains
went to U.S. borrowers, but only about
$60 billion to $70 billion of the losses were
ultimately suffered by U.S. lenders.
There are two real losses associated
with poorly underwritten loans. First, we
built too many homes, and empty homes
cannot generate a return. The economic
loss is not the cost of the empty homes,
but the carry cost until occupancy. There
are currently 400,000 to 500,000 empty
homes beyond the normal inventory. That
is about $100 billion worth of housing. It
will take three to twenty-four months for
this surplus to be absorbed, depending on
the strength of the local economy. While
some empty homes will have longer carry
costs than others, we calculate roughly a
year’s carry on $100 billion, or about $8
billion to $10 billion, is the social loss. Not
much in the $13 trillion U.S. economy,
with its $57 trillion net household wealth.
How can we be sure that the excess
inventory of homes will be absorbed in
roughly a year? Will immigration stop, or
even slow, because of a credit crisis? Will
couples decide not to have children,
because of a credit crisis? No. Births,
deaths, and immigration will be unaffect-
ed, meaning a U.S. population growth of
about three million in 2008. This popula-
tion growth translates into about 1.2 mil-
lion new households—and every house-
hold needs a home. Add to that 100,000
second homes (the average in a normal
year), and the 500,000 to 600,000 homes
that are destroyed each year, and we will
need about 1.8 million homes in 2008,
about 70 percent of which will be owner-
occupied. This amounts to 1.2 million to
1.3 million owner-occupied units
demanded in 2008. The current run rate
of single-family housing production is
800,000. Adding this new production to
the 400,000 to 500,000 excess home
inventory yields a supply of 1.2 million to
1.3 million available in 2008. So in 2008,
demand will push housing inventories
back to normal. Hence, home prices do
not have to plummet, as many suggest, to
restore market balance. All that is needed is
a year of normal-demand growth.
The effect of the credit crisis on hous-
ing is affected by the fact that homeowners
react differently to price changes than
owners of other assets. Imagine that you
learned that your stocks were 10 percent
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overvalued. You would be smart to sell. If
you learned that your bonds were 10 per-
cent overvalued, you’d also sell. But if you
learned that your home was 10 percent
overvalued, would you sell? Probably not.
Selling costs are about 6 percent to 8 per-
cent of your home’s value, selling takes
time, and moving is a huge headache. In
addition, your home provides a guaran-
teed dividend: the joy of living there.
The second major economic loss asso-
ciated with the capital market crisis is the
erosion of the credibility of U.S. capital
markets. As securitization, ratings, under-
writers, hedge funds, collateral, and liquid-
ity were shown to be incomplete, incom-
petent, conflicted, and occasionally cor-
rupt, the world’s trust in U.S. capital mar-
kets declined. And trust is easy to lose, but
hard to regain. The loss of U.S. capital
market credibility—underscored by the
fact that major banks “suddenly” discov-
ered billions in losses—is reflected in the
decline in the value of U.S. dollar and the
reduced U.S. trade deficit. In spite of being
enormously undervalued in terms of pur-
chasing power parity, the dollar has tum-
bled during the credit crisis, as foreign
investors reduced their demand for U.S.
assets. After all, if U.S. assets are as illiquid
and flawed as those at home, why pay a
“safety” premium for U.S. assets?
The weak dollar is good for U.S.
exporters, but bad for American financial
markets and financial firms.The decline of
the U.S. trade deficit reveals that foreign
investors have dramatically reduced their
demand for U.S. assets, which have turned
out not to be as liquid, safe and transpar-
ent as advertised. Thus, the decline of our
trade deficit is bad for the U.S. economy,
as it reflects a decline in the desire of for-
eigners to invest in the United States
(Figure 11). This economic loss associated
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Figure 10: Exchange rates
with lost capital market trust is probably
much larger in magnitude than the loss on
our empty houses.
C O N C L U S I O N
The U.S. economy will grow until the new
government (regardless of which party
wins) attempts to make good on their
promises to “do something” about capital
market excesses, health care, taxes, Iraq,
and global warming. Their attempts will
likely cause uncertainty, leading con-
sumers and businesses to pause. As people
and businesses pause, the economy will go
flat. This means there will be too many
workers, since the hiring that took place in
2008 was in anticipation of growth that
did not occur in 2009. Hence, cost struc-
tures will be too high in 2009, causing
employment to be cut and the unemploy-
ment rate to rise. The recession of 2009
will be billed as the worst ever, but as cer-
tainty returns, the economy will again
move forward.
In the meantime, growth in 2008 will
be a pleasant surprise, unless the govern-
ment does something really dumb (always
a possibility). This government, which
loves to spend, will spend even more in
this election year. While this is not good in
the long term, it will be good for 2008.
Also in 2008, many investors who thought
they were smart will be shown up for just
having had money, as they struggle with
their maturing mismatched short-term
loans. But in five to seven years, asset
prices will be at new highs, overriding con-
cerns about asset/liability mismatches. You
can count on this because greed wins 80
percent of the time.
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Figure 11: The declining U.S. trade deficit indicates decreasing foreign investment
